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ABSTRACT: Since the 2008 global food crisis there has been renewed interest in irrigation infrastructural 
development, which has sometimes been taken up by the same agencies that developed large-scale surface 
irrigation in the 20th century. This article presents a case study of the recent '1000 small dams in 1000 days' 
programme in Turkey to analyse the continuities and ruptures in the way the development of surface irrigation 
infrastructure is conducted by the state. The comparison of two small dam projects in the dynamic agricultural 
province of Izmir shows how the irrigation administration is pursuing its hydraulic mission, sustaining its expertise 
and strengthening its authority. The development of infrastructure goes beyond irrigation objectives, as it 
materialises the iconic power of the state in rural areas by rapidly providing visible results. However, the 
development of public irrigation is taking place in a very different context from that of the 20th century. The state 
faces farmers who are already using groundwater for irrigation and hence challenge the hierarchical organisation 
of public surface irrigation schemes. Although the irrigation administration continues to dictate the terms of 
irrigation development, it acknowledges these changes by engaging in pragmatic discussions with farmers, who 
are no longer mere 'beneficiaries' but actively engage in negotiations to play a significant role in the management 
of newly built irrigation infrastructure. 
 
KEYWORDS: Small dams, conjunctive use, irrigation associations, irrigation cooperatives, bureaucracy, control, 
Turkey 
INTRODUCTION 
In the 19th and 20th centuries the large-scale, state-led development of water resources was a key 
element in the modernisation of agriculture in many countries around the world (Bakker, 2002). In the 
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global South this trend accelerated in the 1950s as governments, often supported by international 
donors, engaged in what has been dubbed a "hydraulic mission" (Allan, 2003; 2010; Wester, 2009). At 
the time, the development of large-scale hydraulic infrastructure was at the heart of nation building, 
implemented by hydraulic administrations, which have been labelled 'hydrocracies' (e.g. Molle et al., 
2009). 
The ambition of the state to control water, land, farming systems, value chains and, ultimately, the 
farmer, characterised large-scale irrigation development (Pascon, 1978; Lees, 1986; Béthemont, 2009). 
However, from the 1980s onwards the central role of the state in planning and managing irrigation 
started to shift due to several trends: (1) increasing recognition of the negative social and 
environmental impacts of the state-led, large-scale irrigation development model (Blanc and Bonin, 
2008; Béthemont et al., 2003) and the dissatisfaction of users who subverted the planned development 
process (Poncet et al., 2010), (2) the financial burden that large-scale irrigation represented for the 
state in a context of economic liberalisation and structural adjustment plans (Sampath, 1992), (3) the 
promotion by donors and governments of participatory irrigation management and/or the transfer of 
management responsibilities to farmersʼ associations (Coward, 1980; Ostrom, 1992; Agrawal, 2003) and 
(4) the "general abundance of foodgrain in the world associated with the rapidly escalating capital cost 
of surface irrigation development" (Svendsen and Rosegrant, 1994). 
At the same time hydraulic 'bureaucracies', reluctant to devolve their power, continued to function 
in a similar way (Molle et al., 2009). They often used reforms imposed on them by external donors to 
maintain the upper hand in irrigation management and development, for example by creating water 
users associations subordinated to the administration (Suhardiman, 2013; Harris and Islar, 2014). 
Hydraulic administrations in the global South, therefore, did not actually abandon their hydraulic 
mission (Swatuk, 2008). They officially complied with institutional and policy reforms in the 1990s and 
early 2000s and pursued their core activity of infrastructure planning and development. 
Following the global food crisis and the recommendations in the World Development Report 2008 
(World Bank, 2007), there has been a striking return of infrastructure development projects in the 
agricultural sector worldwide. These have included desalination in Morocco, multiple donor-supported 
irrigation projects in Cambodia (Ivars and Venot, 2018) and the Sahel Irrigation Initiative funded by the 
World Bank that aims to extend the current irrigated area from 400,000 ha to 1 million ha in the Sahel 
region of West Africa (World Bank, 2017). The promotion of infrastructural projects appears to be 
taking place with a new rhetoric of modernity and development, since what is presented as 'modern' 
has evolved over time in accordance with changing expectations: dimensions of participation, 
'integrated projects', social and, more recently, environmental considerations. However, supply-driven 
water management strategies focusing on the construction of irrigation infrastructure are being 
implemented in a different context from that of the 20th century. Arguably, one of the biggest and 
most profound changes in irrigation over the past 40 years concerns the emergence of a global 
'groundwater economy' (Shah et al., 2003). In a context of increased water demand, the availability of 
relatively cheap pumping technology and water policies driven by ideas of economic liberalisation, 
groundwater-based private irrigation has boomed, also within public irrigation schemes (Giordano and 
Villholth, 2007), boosting the agricultural economy (Shah et al., 2003; Shah, 2005; Llamas and Martínez-
Santos, 2005). More than 100 million ha, i.e. a third of the world’s irrigated area, now rely on 
groundwater abstraction (Margat and van der Gun, 2013). In this groundwater economy farmers have 
invested in tubewells mainly on their own initiative rather than through their governments or 
communities. Where farmers gained experience in irrigation development, the state in many cases had 
little expertise in groundwater extraction or management or even lacked the legitimacy to intervene in 
groundwater-based irrigation (Shah, 2009). Thus, public irrigation projects have to deal with new field 
realities after 30 to 40 years of a farmer-led expanding groundwater economy. Within this new context, 
the aim of this article is to analyse how the planning and implementation of infrastructure and the 
management of and access to irrigation supply are negotiated between farmers and the hydraulic 
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administrations. This article is investigates the case of Turkey’s hydraulic administration, which is 
investing in new infrastructure for agricultural development, and its farmers, who have experience, 
some of several decades, in using groundwater for irrigation. This study shows how the renewed 
encounter between the hydraulic administration and rural communities is characterised by negotiations 
concerning the management of new irrigation infrastructure. 
The article begins by looking at two contrasting small dam projects, implemented as part of a 
national initiative named '1000 small dams in 1000 days'. This initiative marks the presence of the state 
in rural areas through the development of irrigation infrastructure and constitutes, we argue, the 
pursuit and adaptation of its hydraulic mission in a new context. Taking 'small dams' as an entry point 
for our analysis echoes older and more recent scholarly attention to irrigation infrastructure (Molle, 
1994; Shah and Raju, 2002; Riaux et al., 2014; Venot and Krishnan, 2011) that has been shown to 
provide an interesting vantage point from which to study broader issues of the governance of natural 
resources (Aubriot and Prabhakar, 2011). Compared to large dams, which have mostly been studied in 
relation to issues of displacement, social conflict and environmental impacts, small dams offer an 
opportunity to analyse the encounter between planned irrigation projects and existing irrigation 
dynamics at a local scale. This is possible because of their specific characteristics: these are small 
projects and yet they can have significant impacts on rural communities at the local level; they can be 
planned and built rapidly, often as part of national-level initiatives. Indeed, a small dam is a hydraulic 
object but also a symbolic one. Governments in many countries worldwide have resorted to this 
strategy to showcase their role, as well as assert their authority over rural areas (e.g. Venot and 
Krishnan, 2011; see also Faggi, 1990, for a similar argument on irrigation projects in general). 
We will show that, in the case of Turkey, the '1000 small dams in 1000 days' programme should be 
read as a continuation of the administration’s hydraulic mission. However, since it is taking place in a 
context where groundwater now plays a significant role in the rural economy, the way this mission is 
unfolding at the local level has changed considerably. We will demonstrate this through two contrasting 
case studies. The first relates to a new small dam coveted by a well-organised irrigation cooperative 
located outside a publicly managed irrigation system. The second relates to an irrigation community 
located within the large-scale Gediz irrigation scheme, originally established by the state but where 
farmers now irrigate individually using groundwater. This community appears much more reluctant to 
engage in collective action concerning irrigation water, including the management of a newly built small 
dam. Before turning to the case studies, the following section provides a brief overview of the role of 
the Turkish state in irrigation development. 
THE ENGAGEMENT OF THE TURKISH STATE IN IRRIGATION DEVELOPMENT 
This section provides some keys to understanding the hydraulic administration’s current modes of 
engagement in the irrigation sector and looks at the many changes in the institutional history of water 
development and management in Turkey, as well as at the continued importance of irrigation for the 
state. The hydraulic administration has continued to develop expertise and indeed a certain monopoly 
on irrigation despite the apparent contrasts between (1) a period that saw the development of surface 
water and the construction of large-scale irrigation schemes (1950s-1980s), (2) a period of irrigation 
management transfer (since the late 1980s, early 1990s) and (3) an increase in the use of private 
groundwater (particularly since the 1990s). Irrigation continued to play a central role not only in 
agricultural development but also in the building of the nation. The hydraulic administration remained 
involved in the management of water resources, for example through the supervision of irrigation 
associations, while the recent '1000 small dams in 1000 days' programme marks the pursuit of a direct 
role in the development of irrigation infrastructure. 
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Irrigation management transfer and the hydraulic bureaucracy 
After the fall of the Ottoman Empire the republican elite led by M. Kemal Atatürk aimed to modernise 
Turkey and establish a modern state by creating a new legal system and public bureaucracy (Kibaroğlu 
and Baskan, 2011). Between the 1920s and 1950s the state focused on the exploration of new land and 
water resources (Tigrek and Kibaroğlu, 2011), through surveys led by new government bodies, for 
example the Ministry of Public Works and the Electrical Power Resources Survey and Development 
Administration (Kibaroğlu and Baskan, 2011). These organisations also oversaw the implementation of 
the first large-scale hydraulic infrastructure. One of the most pressing goals was to improve public 
health, which explains why the Ministry of Health formulated the Law on Waters. This led to investment 
in drinking water supply and the draining of swamps (ibid). The country’s economic development was 
stimulated by transforming large spaces of the Turkish urban and rural geography through the intensive 
construction of infrastructure and the systematic exploitation of water resources for hydropower or 
irrigation. 
In 1953 the State Hydraulic Works (Turkish acronym DSI) was created and became central to the 
state’s involvement in the irrigation sector, with technical water expertise concentrated in a civil 
engineering corps. The DSI answers directly to the central government at national level rather than to 
local administrations, which gives it a high level of autonomy. Through the DSI the state invested 
massively in large-scale hydraulic planning for Turkey’s socioeconomic development (Warner, 2008; 
Kibaroğlu et al., 2009). This also led to a centralised and nationalised system of resources management 
that reinforced the government’s power over certain regions, as in the case of the GAP in the east of 
Turkey (Güneydoğu Anadolu Projesi, or Southeastern Anatolia Project) (Harris and Alatout, 2010). 
As public expenditure was high, Turkey adopted new water management approaches in the 1990s to 
satisfy conditions laid down by major donors, including the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the 
World Bank (Kibaroğlu et al., 2012). The state liberalised the water sector and engaged in the transfer 
of irrigation management, as explained by Warner (2008): "the Turks clearly decided not to fight the 
'consensus' but rather conform to it when money became very tight in 1994. (…) To be able to count on 
its water wealth to help secure its security position – but finding itself able neither to access 
multilateral funds nor to shoulder the cost of GAP on its own – Turkey liberalised its water sector". 
Thus, in 1993 the Turkish government embarked on an ambitious reform project to transfer irrigation 
management from the DSI to local irrigation associations. This was also motivated by a desire to reduce 
the administrative and financial burdens on the state caused by large-scale surface irrigation systems 
(Svendsen and Murray-Rust, 2001; Yercan, 2003; Yercan et al., 2004, 2009; Dorsan et al., 2004; Koç, 
2007; Kibaroğlu et al., 2009). In an accelerated programme the DSI transferred the management of 
close to 1 million ha in 3 years (Svendsen and Nott, 2000). Uysal and Atış (2010) calculated that, by 
2004, 1.86 million ha (i.e. 94% of the total area under the direct control of the DSI) had been 
transferred. 
However, the DSI was able to maintain a power base in the large-scale irrigation schemes whose 
management had been transferred. Only the responsibility for the operation and maintenance (O&M) 
of the irrigation networks had been transferred to irrigation associations. The latter were responsible 
for distributing water to farmers, cleaning, maintaining and repairing the canals and collecting 
payments. The DSI still owned the infrastructure (Scheumann and Ul-Hassan, 2001) and remained in 
charge of the overall planning of water distribution. While the transfer of management to irrigation 
associations brought change – for example, improved fee collection (Dorsan et al., 2004), reduced 
wages and an expansion of the irrigated area in some cases (Yercan et al., 2004) – the DSI retained its 
coordinating role and technical expertise. Our interviews with farmers within the large-scale irrigation 
scheme of Menemen in 2015 and 2016 reflect the key position the DSI has maintained: irrigators feel 
barely involved in decision-making in what they repeatedly refer to as the "DSI’s irrigation scheme". 
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Furthermore, it was not until 2009 that farmers directly elected members of the irrigation 
association boards. In 2011 there was even an overt return of the DSI to irrigation management: Law 
6172 of 2011 transformed existing irrigation associations into legal public entities under the authority 
of the DSI. While the absence of a law clarifying the status of irrigation associations and their 
relationships with the DSI may have hampered their involvement in operation and maintenance (Uysal 
and Atış, 2010), the new law could be interpreted as a means for the administration to maintain control 
over irrigation management (as is the case in Morocco, where Water Users Associations have a member 
of the administration on their board; see Kadiri et al., 2009, for an analysis of the appropriation of these 
associations by local communities). The DSI’s influence over irrigation associations and irrigation 
management more generally was clearly highlighted during our interviews: 
Irrigation associations initially faced some issues. The DSI had to transfer the management of its irrigation 
networks, so these associations were created, but before there was real regulation. (…) Participation is 
good (…) but without control [by the DSI] it leads to political behaviour: employment of friends, low fee 
collection from the farmers… Many associations got into debt" (interview with a secretary of an irrigation 
association in the Menemen plains, Gediz basin, 2015). 
Our interviews with board members of irrigation associations also showed that the management 
transfer frequently led to problems of maintenance: "the main issue was the deterioration of irrigation 
networks. There are places without water because canals ended up in poor condition" (interview with a 
secretary of an irrigation association in the Menemen plains, Gediz basin, 2015). This justified the DSI’s 
supervisory role over the irrigation associations with regard to the technical and administrative aspects 
of large-scale schemes and particularly its control of the budgets. 
Turkey thus officially embraced the international trend towards irrigation management transfer in 
large public irrigation schemes. However, while it conformed to the consensus, as argued by Warner 
(2008), the DSI never intended to abandon its core activity of irrigation planning and development and 
supervising irrigation associations. This is illustrated, for example, by the implementation of the GAP, 
which continued well into the 1990s (Özerol and Bressers, 2016). 
Keeping an eye on private groundwater use through formal irrigation cooperatives 
As in many other countries, groundwater use in Turkey has increased significantly in recent decades. 
According to the DSI, groundwater irrigated areas increased from 100,000 ha in 1978 to over 600,000 
ha in 2012. These figures are likely to underestimate actual groundwater-based irrigated areas, as (1) 
they are difficult to monitor as farmers often dig wells on their own initiative, and (2) they overlook the 
extent of conjunctive use of surface water and groundwater within large-scale irrigation schemes. 
In contrast to many countries where the groundwater boom took place 'under the radar' of the 
administration (see Shah, 2009 on South Asia), state involvement in groundwater exploitation was high 
in Turkey. Indeed, while farmers often gain access to and use groundwater individually, the state 
monitored this sector, especially through the establishment of irrigation cooperatives. Although based 
on a legal framework dating back to 1954, such cooperatives have not been much studied. They 
partially inspired the irrigation management transfer programme (Svendsen and Nott, 2000) and, 
according to the DSI, represented about 480,000 ha of groundwater-based irrigation in 2014. Irrigation 
cooperatives are formal, farmer-managed organisations (with dozens to hundreds of members), which 
manage small-scale irrigation schemes at village level (500 to 1000 ha). They are responsible for 
managing collective boreholes, including the distribution of groundwater to farmers, the maintenance 
and repair of the boreholes and the collection of fees from farmers. They coordinate with the energy 
company, the DSI and the local authorities. In some cases, irrigation cooperatives also manage local 
surface water resources. Cooperatives enabled the collective organisation of groundwater irrigation, 
which farmers otherwise often engage in on an individual basis. They allowed an increase in irrigated 
area by providing water to farmers who otherwise could not have invested in a borehole. As with 
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irrigation associations in large-scale systems, cooperatives face multiple challenges, including high 
levels of debt. Based on our analysis, the keys to a cooperative’s 'success' appear to be: (1) the 
centrality of its role in the local economy through its enabling of irrigated agriculture, (2) the degree to 
which it controls the distribution of water resources in the area (cf. Shah, 1995 on the concept of the 
'salience' of milk cooperatives) and (3) its membersʼ relationships with the local administration and the 
DSI. Although irrigation cooperatives are far less dependent on the DSI than irrigation associations, they 
nevertheless constitute a way for the state to supervise groundwater abstraction. Within irrigation 
cooperatives, water is not extracted by countless uncontrollable individual pumps but distributed by a 
few collective boreholes, which are drilled with the authorisation of the DSI and often equipped under 
their technical supervision. Irrigation cooperatives are also a conduit through which the irrigation 
administration can promote specific practices and technologies, such as drip irrigation, or even with 
whom they negotiate the specifics of projects, such as the management of newly constructed small 
dams. As such, although not at the core of its activity, the DSI has always maintained expertise in 
groundwater exploration and a key role in providing authorisation and technical recommendations for 
drilling. The role of the DSI, and sometimes of the Special Provincial Administration, in groundwater 
governance was clearly highlighted during our interviews with employees and board members of 
several irrigation cooperatives in Izmir: "in 2005 Özel Idare [the Special Provincial Administration] 
installed a closed [pressurised] irrigation system for six boreholes. This was free of charge. But we had 
to pay back the project they carried out in 2008 [a similar project for other boreholes]" (interview with 
a president of a cooperative, Izmir province, 2015). 
The '1000 small dams in 1000 days' programme: Pursuing public irrigation development 
In 2006 the State Planning Organisation of the Turkish Prime Ministry prepared the government’s ninth 
development plan 2007-2013, which recognised "the significant role of irrigation in improving the 
performance of the agricultural sector" and highlighted the need to expand irrigation further. In 2012 
the Minister of Forestry and Water Affairs launched the '1000 small dams in 1000 days' programme on 
a national scale. According to the information provided in 2016 by the DSI, who implemented the 
programme, the aim was to increase the total water storage by 750 Mm3 to irrigate an additional 
170,000 ha. The small dam programme was intended to provide faster results than larger projects, with 
greater geographical coverage: "it is easy with small dams. To build a small dam we can do everything in 
three years! (…) Small dams are better than big dams for local development; they only affect a limited 
area. Also, we have a rate of return in only seven years!" (interview with DSI employee in Ankara, 
2017). Interviews with DSI staff also illustrated how the programme showcased the role of central 
government in country-wide rural development: "it is a programme launched by the Minister of 
Forestry and Water Affairs to improve irrigation. (…) We, we do as much as possible, according to what 
is possible in our region" (interview with DSI employee in Izmir, 2017). 
Indeed, the programme was presented as the government having to prevent contestation by the 
rural population. The latter felt marginalised following the restructuring of the agricultural sector that 
entailed a reform of the credit system, a reduction in subsidies, the privatisation of agricultural 
companies and the restructuring of marketing cooperatives (Aydın, 2002; 2010; Keyder and Yenal, 
2011). This was exacerbated by administrative reforms under the metropolisation policy, which led to 
the suppression of many local municipalities and village authorities, and the extension of metropolitan 
areas. More than half the population are now officially 'metropolitan' residents, despite actually living 
in remote villages in sparsely populated rural areas. These reforms also affected water management as 
they weakened the organisations in charge of local rural planning, which were directly involved in the 
development of small-scale irrigation. For instance, the role of muhtars, village representatives, was 
reduced to administrative support, while the General Directorate of Rural Services and, subsequently, 
the Special Provincial Administration, both of whom had been active in rural development programmes, 
ceased to exist. 
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In this context, the gölet (small dam), a hydraulic artefact, became a political object, and the '1000 
small dams in 1000 days' programme a channel through which the central government could showcase 
its continued interest in rural areas by investing in hydraulic infrastructure. According to the DSI, the 
programme was intended to contribute to several national objectives, including (1) increased water 
storage capacity, (2) the transition from rainfed to irrigated agriculture in rural areas that were not 
covered by large-scale irrigation schemes and (3) the transition to pressurised irrigation systems 
(sprinkler and drip – more easily installed in small dam projects than converting large-scale schemes) to 
alleviate the pressure on groundwater resources. The programme also aimed to stimulate the Turkish 
economy by involving the private sector in infrastructure construction, under the supervision of the DSI 
– a trend that had begun in the 1990s. Beyond the national objectives the DSI’s communication 
materials emphasised the project’s economic, environmental and social goals at the local level, such as 
increased revenue from irrigated agriculture, the prevention of fire and soil erosion, flood protection 
and the creation of recreational areas. 
The DSI played a key role in implementing the programme. Its regional delegations were in charge of 
designing as many small dam projects as possible. Though the programme faced delays, 1000 projects 
had been identified, and many built, by 2016. The choice of dam sites was to be based on hydrological 
and economic opportunities. When a request was made locally – by muhtars or irrigation cooperatives, 
for instance – the DSI undertook a feasibility study and subsequently financed the construction of the 
small dam from its own budget, without needing permission from local authorities or other ministries. 
The majority of small dams were built with irrigation development in mind, but a few with low irrigation 
potential were justified by other means, such as fire prevention, or were simply a response to political 
pressure ahead of elections. There was no official consultation with local communities prior to 
construction. The DSI contacted those local actors to whom it wished to delegate the management of 
the gölet once it was built. Based on our interviews with the DSI, we assume that, as well as 
representing a technocratic approach to irrigation development, the general lack of consultation in the 
planning of the small dam projects reflected a desire to achieve visible results quickly rather than 
enhance integrated local development. Yet, despite the apparently linear, top-down, homogenous 
planning and design of the dams, the DSI looked for 'takers' of the project in a pragmatic way. DSI 
representatives were able to transfer the management of the small dams to irrigation cooperatives, 
district municipalities or village authorities (outside the metropolitan areas). However, the transfer 
would take place on the condition that the cost of the project would be reimbursed by users, which had 
to be negotiated on a case-by-case basis. This had not been implemented by 2016. The following 
section investigates two small dam projects with contrasting situations in terms of irrigation practices: 
one where farmers have organised themselves in irrigation cooperatives around groundwater 
abstraction and another where the community has access to a large surface irrigation scheme built by 
the state. 
METHODOLOGY AND BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE CASE STUDIES 
We adopted an empirical approach using a specific irrigation infrastructure – small dams – as an entry 
point to explore around 40 years of irrigation practice in Turkey’s Izmir province. The main objective of 
the study was to investigate the encounter between the state and farmers in a context where state-led 
small dam projects are often implemented in areas where farmers have organised themselves to 
abstract groundwater for irrigation. 
To show how the local history of irrigation influenced the relationship between farmers and the DSI, 
research was conducted in two contrasting regions of Izmir province – one entirely dependent on 
groundwater, the other characterised by conjunctive water use in a large-scale irrigation system. In the 
first case we selected the village of Bağyurdu in Kemalpaşa district and in the second the village of 
Emiralem in Menemen district (see Figure 1). In Kemalpaşa district formal irrigation cooperatives 
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manage groundwater access and distribution at the village scale. These cooperatives enable farmers to 
grow profitable irrigated crops without having to invest in expensive individual tubewells. The 
Menemen district, on the other hand, is located in the downstream part of the large-scale Gediz 
irrigation scheme, which is characterised by conjunctive water use. There, although farmers are 
supposedly organised in irrigation associations to operate and maintain canals, countless private 
tubewells dot the agricultural landscape, competing with and complementing the surface water 
delivered by the public irrigation system. In this case, individual access to groundwater offers farmers 
an opportunity to switch to higher value crops and presents an alternative to the bureaucratic 
organisation of irrigation. 
In both case studies we conducted open and semi-structured interviews with farmers, board 
members of the irrigation cooperatives (in Bağyurdu and the neighbouring villages) and irrigation 
associations (in Menemen), together with direct observation of agricultural practice in the two villages. 
Semi-structured interviews with key figures in 13 other communities (including seven irrigation 
cooperatives) potentially involved in the '1000 small dams in 1000 days' programme in Izmir province 
gave our results a broader perspective. We also conducted interviews with local officials from the 
Ministry of Food, Agriculture and Livestock in both districts, and with representatives of the chambers 
of agriculture. Finally, we interviewed DSI staff in Izmir and Ankara for general information about the 
small dam programme and to discuss our field observations. 
Figure 1. Location of the case studies. 
 
Note: We used vector maps provided by the IFEA (French Institute of Anatolian Studies) 
The relationships between the state and its irrigation administration on the one hand and the 
communities and farmers on the other differ in the two case studies. In the village of Bağyurdu in 
Kemalpaşa district although the irrigation cooperative is relatively autonomous, it frequently interacts 
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with the DSI, particularly when the latter plans, designs and implements new projects, such as the 
installation of tubewells or the modernisation of irrigation facilities. In Emiralem in the Menemen 
district the relationship between farmers and the DSI is tense. This is linked to the fact that farmers 
previously refused to use and pay for surface water, leading to the removal of the surface irrigation 
infrastructure and precipitating a switch to individual, groundwater-based irrigation. In the following 
sections we will show how their divergent histories of irrigation management and development 
influenced the way each community engaged with the DSI’s initiative of building a small dam in their 
vicinity. 
IMPLEMENTING A SMALL DAM PROJECT: CONTRASTING FARMER RESPONSES 
Cooperatives and surface water: Formal institutions and a coveted resource 
Agriculture in Kemalpaşa district was rain-fed until groundwater access enabled the irrigated fruit 
production for which the region is now known (peaches, olives, grapes), particularly its exported 
cherries. Groundwater was first used by a few farmers in the 1970-1980s and then expanded in the 
1990s with growing numbers of individual private boreholes used concomitantly with drip irrigation. 
From the 1960s onwards ten irrigation cooperatives were established in the Kemalpaşa district, mostly 
along the tributaries of the Nif river (see Figure 2), irrigating a total area of more than 3000 ha by 2015. 
This figure can be compared with the area irrigated individually or collectively in the district, which was 
evaluated in 2015 at 13,000 ha by the Ministry of Agriculture. 
Figure 2. Irrigation systems in the agricultural valley of Kemalpaşa. 
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The expansion of irrigation cooperatives, in number and area, went hand in hand with the development 
of irrigation and arboriculture in the district and is an indication that collective irrigation management 
at village level has strengthened over time. In successful cooperatives the board and employees 
regularly interact with their members to ensure the efficiency and security of the water distribution 
system. This includes reducing water turns, establishing lists and making staff work at night. "During 
summer I work until midnight to open and close the valves for the water turns. (…) Now it is calmer. 
This morning a farmer called me; a pipe was leaking close to his garden" (interview with a cooperative 
employee, Izmir province, 2016). However, not all cooperatives followed the same trajectory, and such 
organisation should not be idealised. In villages where farmers rely on irrigation for their livelihoods 
some cooperatives took control of water services, managing both surface and groundwater access. In 
villages with active land markets, cooperatives progressively took over more surface area through 
flexible rules for water use (but strict rules for payments and debts), with staff providing services right 
up to farm plots. Meanwhile, other cooperatives faced real difficulties, particularly concerning the 
repayment of debts to the DSI for borehole installation or securing the energy costs of their operation. 
Cooperatives in Kemalpaşa sometimes faced challenges stemming from farmersʼ lack of interest in 
irrigated agriculture and preference for livestock, which reduced the number of potential members. 
In recent years irrigation cooperatives have faced major financial challenges. These were related to 
increased energy costs due to a drop in the water table (which varies between 20 and 250 metres in the 
area) triggered by growing numbers of boreholes and the establishment of water-consuming industries. 
The increased energy costs also partly explained why irrigation cooperatives 'welcomed' the state’s 
small dam programme in the region. 
The irrigation cooperative of Bağyurdu in Kemalpaşa district is one of the biggest in the area with 
800 members officially, irrigating 700 ha. Plots there are very small (0.3-0.5 ha) and the average farm 
size is 2-3 ha, only part of which is irrigated. The cooperative became operational in 1981 when the DSI 
installed 16 boreholes. It has managed to reimburse the total investment of the 22 boreholes it now 
owns, among which 18 were functioning in 2017. The boreholes are interconnected and the network is 
structured in three main pipelines supplying water to farms. In addition to groundwater, the irrigation 
cooperative also provided surface water through a small diversion structure, but surface water only 
flowed until May. From May onwards only groundwater is generally used. Between 2012 and 2014 a 37 
metre-high small dam (0.432 Mm3) was built upstream of the irrigation cooperative as part of the '1000 
small dams in 1000 days' programme. The dam was designed for agricultural use, with an underground 
water distribution network intended to irrigate 115 ha. During the planning stage of the project the DSI 
contacted the Bağyurdu cooperative informally to obtain information on the local agricultural and 
irrigation conditions, but no official meetings were held. 
Once it was constructed the cooperative was very keen to manage the small dam, for several 
reasons. First, more than 70 ha of the 115 ha of the project area were already irrigated by the 
cooperative’s groundwater and many of the remaining plots belonged to its members, who often own 
several small, dispersed plots. Second, the irrigation cooperative was already using the surface water 
that would now be stored in the dam. Third, despite the renowned stability of the cooperative over the 
years, it faced increasing energy costs due to the drop in the water table, and the gravity-based 
distribution of pressurised water from the dam could help lower those costs. Fourth, obtaining the 
management of this particular small dam played a central role in the medium-term strategy of the 
cooperative, since surface water had become a coveted resource with the increasing cost of pumping. 
Another project for the construction of a larger dam (25 Mm3) was underway in a neighbouring village 
to benefit four villages, including Bağyurdu. Obtaining the management of the small dam could 
strengthen Bağyurdu’s position in the coming negotiation for the management of the bigger dam, as 
the cooperative would be able to show it had experience in surface water management. The 
cooperative was also keen to test the DSI’s new technology – a remote-controlled, automatic valve 
opening system that marked the latter’s claim to 'modernity'. 
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Negotiations over the management of Bağyurdu’s small dam revealed several issues linked to 
Turkey’s recent administrative reforms, giving the metropolis and district municipalities greater power. 
With the abolishment of small municipalities and village authorities in metropolitan areas, such as that 
to which Kemalpaşa now formally belongs, small dam management could only be transferred locally to 
either the district municipality or irrigation cooperatives. The DSI preferred the latter, due to their 
longstanding relationship: "the cooperative has to manage the small dam in Bağyurdu. They know how 
to irrigate at least! And [Kemalpasa’s district] municipality is so far away…" (interview with a DSI agent 
in Izmir, 2017). This allowed the cooperative to connect the pressurised network distributing water 
from the small dam to its own groundwater distribution system, despite the district administration 
informing the DSI in early 2016 that it wished to manage the dam, thereby putting on hold the official 
transfer of its management to the irrigation cooperative. 
Interviews with board members of other irrigation cooperatives put the case of Bağyurdu in 
perspective. The water stored in the newly built small dams in Kemalpaşa is coveted by most irrigation 
cooperatives, such as Bağyurdu, due to the increasing energy costs associated with the groundwater 
they have been using for decades. Surface water is seen as a new resource that can be used 
conjunctively with groundwater. However, not all cooperatives have managed to mobilise their 
members and negotiate with the DSI to take on the management of the newly built small dams. 
Resistance in Emiralem: Rejecting management responsibilities but using the water 
The Gediz basin (northeast of Izmir) has witnessed large-scale, state-led irrigation development since 
1938. This 96,700 ha scheme is irrigated with surface water from two main reservoirs – the Marmara 
lake and the Demirköprü dam. In 1994 the Gediz basin was selected as one of the DSI’s four pilot 
schemes for the transfer of irrigation management. Ten irrigation associations were established in 1995 
(Svendsen and Murray-Rust, 2001), including the 'Menemen Left Bank IA' (16,500 ha) and the 
'Menemen Right Bank IA' (6365 ha). These two irrigation associations manage two open canals 
diverting water from the Emiralem regulator (Figure 3), which was built between 1939 and 1944. 
The case study village of Emiralem is in Menemen district, just north of Izmir in the downstream part 
of the Gediz basin. It was incorporated into the large-scale surface irrigation system in the 1990s and 
has since faced numerous challenges. Although groundwater abstraction in the surface irrigation 
system was barely mentioned during our interviews with representatives of the DSI and the Ministry of 
Agriculture in Izmir, in the field it became the key to Emiralem’s irrigation development. By the 1990s 
its farmers had already started using groundwater to grow high-value horticultural crops, considering 
that canal irrigation did not suit their needs, rather viewing it as adapted to 'real large-scale agriculture', 
such as the cotton production further downstream. 
For 20 years Emiralem’s horticultural farmers showed no interest in contributing to the operation or 
management of the canals. They almost exclusively used groundwater, which supported a switch from 
extensive grazing to high-value horticultural production on intensively managed small plots (0.05 to 0.2 
ha, producing strawberries, peppers, lettuce, etc). A combination of groundwater use, drip irrigation 
and greenhouses allows farmers to sell their products before or after the peak production seasons, 
thereby obtaining high incomes. They look out for new production techniques, try rotations, visit 
agricultural trade fairs, for instance in Antalya. This situation would eventually lead the Menemen left 
bank irrigation association to literally remove the secondary and tertiary canals in 2012, and thus 
Emiralem’s access to surface water, even though the village is still officially part of the scheme. 
The hydraulic administration marked its re-engagement in Emiralem by constructing a 26 metre-high 
small dam (1.37 Mm3 of storage capacity) as part of the '1000 small dams in 1000 days' programme. 
The dam was designed to irrigate 212 ha with a buried distribution network suitable for drip irrigation 
(see Figure 3 below). As in Bağyurdu, water distribution is possible without pumping and hence requires 
no energy, meaning low costs for water distribution. However, the future manager of the dam will have 
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to repay its investment cost, i.e. around 110,000 TL/year for 30 years according to the farmers 
(€32,000/year as at March 2016). After two years of construction the reservoir was filled with water in 
2015. 
Figure 3. Official irrigation schemes in Emiralem. 
 
Interestingly, there is now a conflicting discourse about who originally requested the small dam. 
According to the DSI, the dam was constructed at the request of the local population, whereas the 
inhabitants say they never asked for it. By 2016 no formal body had taken on the management of the 
dam despite several negotiations being opened between the DSI and local authorities. In late winter 
2014, once the dam had been built, the DSI asked for the creation of a cooperative to manage the small 
dam, but the farmers did not want to get involved. The farmers of Emiralem are interested in the good 
quality, cheap water offered by the small dam as it can be linked to their farm distribution system 
through the pressurised network. They criticise the poor surface water quality of the Gediz, polluted by 
industries upstream, and point to the high pumping costs of groundwater. However, they are not keen 
to create a cooperative to manage the small dam. The farmers we interviewed mentioned their 
negative experience with a previous irrigation cooperative set up in the 1980s to manage collective 
pumping from the Gediz River, saying it would not be the right choice for Emiralem. They told us that 
running a cooperative requires a lot of time and that they are already involved in time-consuming 
market-gardening activities and the sale of the products.  
The employee [of the cooperative] was earning 800 TL to sleep all day long, whereas I work twenty hours 
and sleep four hours when I go to the market. I even doze off on the road… We don’t want someone who 
sleeps twenty hours and works four hours! No, a cooperative here, it’s impossible (interview with a farmer 
in Emiralem, 2016). 
As no cooperative was created in 2015, the DSI looked for other options. The municipality was not 
interested in taking on the management of the dam and had no experience in irrigation management. 
The DSI then suggested that the existing Menemen Left Bank irrigation association should take over 
(Emiralem’s farmers were still officially members of the association). The association initially agreed in a 
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general assembly, before retracting. According to some of the board members of the association, the 
small dam was a possible solution to the declining water table faced by farmers, but the removal of the 
irrigation canals in the 2000s had left a tense relationship between farmers and the irrigation 
association, making the latter unwilling to manage the dam: "they don’t know how to work together 
there!" (interview with the secretary of the irrigation association, 2016). As no formal organisation 
accepted to manage the small dam in Emiralem, the DSI let the villagers use the water. Individually or 
organised into small, informal groups, farmers installed pipes to bring the water to plots located 
beyond the official boundary of the scheme, which allowed them to decrease their groundwater 
consumption in the summer of 2015. The DSI hoped this would serve as an incentive for creating a 
cooperative: "the small dam was full; we were not going to waste the water. At least they [the farmers] 
will see it is good water. Next year they will need a cooperative" (interview with a DSI agent, 2016). In 
2017, after three years of informal use, the situation was unchanged; no cooperative had been created 
and farmers continued to use water from the small dam informally. However, tensions started to 
appear, and farmers accused one another of wasting water. That year the water stored in the dam was 
used up within 2 months, while, according to some farmers, it could have lasted for 3-4 months. It 
remains to be seen whether this will trigger a collective answer to the management of the small dam. 
DISCUSSION: POWER OF THE STATE, EMANCIPATION OF THE FARMERS? 
Small dams and groundwater: A hydraulic mission never abandoned 
Notwithstanding the institutional actors and management models that emerged in the irrigation sector 
from the 1980s onwards, we argue that the Turkish hydraulic administration never really abandoned its 
'hydraulic mission' and continues to exert significant control over the sector. 
We interpret the '1000 small dams in 1000 days' programme as a manifestation of (1) the DSI’s 
continued involvement in irrigation planning and development and (2) its ability to face new realities 
and the will of the central government to widely and quickly demonstrate its involvement for the 
benefit of rural areas. According to the DSI, small dams allowed irrigation to extend beyond the 
agricultural plains, where large-scale schemes are located, towards hillier and more remote areas that 
hitherto relied exclusively on intermittent streams and groundwater, thus contributing to the 
government’s objective of developing agriculture. Furthermore, recent literature (Venot and Krishnan, 
2011) has highlighted how, as relatively quick to plan and build, small dams have been an effective way 
for the state to respond to local political demands, to reinforce its legitimacy and, in the process, re-
assert its control over rural areas. 
Interestingly, the DSI also managed to retain an important role in the groundwater economy, unlike 
other countries where the development of groundwater use took place 'under the radar' of the state (El 
Agha et al., 2017). The DSI actively engaged with the booming groundwater economy, notably through 
its authorisation of well drilling and its technical recommendations, the planning and implementation of 
collective boreholes and the establishment of irrigation cooperatives to manage them. However, its 
control of groundwater abstraction is at best partial due to the countless illegal individual boreholes. 
From power over farmers through hydraulic works to negotiation for control 
We showed that the implementation of the '1000 small dams in 1000 days' programme cannot ignore a 
new trend in irrigation, i.e. the increasing role of groundwater, which is often accessed and used at the 
farmersʼ initiative. The case of Kemalpaşa showed groundwater to be the 'collective lever' of an 
irrigation community engaging in high-value arboriculture in areas located outside surface irrigation 
projects. The case of Emiralem, on the other hand, highlighted the autonomy obtained through 
groundwater use within a large-scale surface irrigation system. It has become a way for farmers to cope 
with bureaucracy through 'informal adjustments' (Lees, 1986) as small-scale farming and centralised 
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irrigation management are often incompatible (Béthemont, 2009). As explained by Lees (1986), 
"standardised bureaucratic rules oblige farmers either to behave in ways inappropriate to their variable 
circumstances, or to break the rules". As observed in North Africa (Kuper et al., 2016), tapping 
groundwater was often a key to autonomy for farmers who aimed to 'free' themselves from 'state' 
water and its constraints in large, gravity-based irrigation schemes. Whether within or outside of large 
irrigation schemes, accessing groundwater generally gave farmers the opportunity to acquire 
experience of irrigation and also, in the case of irrigation cooperatives, of negotiation processes with 
local state authorities, something that would prove central when the DSI investigated and implemented 
small dam projects. 
The involvement of the hydraulic administration in the irrigation sector is changing, as public 
projects are implemented in a context of over 30 years of private groundwater economy. It is 
undeniable that in Turkey the DSI has retained its authority over surface water ownership and use. It 
retained institutional and technical control thanks to the exclusive expertise of its engineers or through 
its closely associated private contractors. When it comes to small dam projects, the DSI is often alone in 
defining the contractual conditions under which the management of the dams is transferred to village 
authorities, municipalities or irrigation cooperatives. However, this is not a one-way process, and water 
users are far from mere passive observers. Local communities and authorities can resist (for example by 
continuing private groundwater use), skirting the conditions of project transfer, or engage in 
negotiations to influence the terms of the transfer. While the plannersʼ vision for the irrigated 
landscape can materialise through infrastructure, its control, management and, ultimately, its use 
require the elaboration of norms and rules to be appropriated by the users. The administration may still 
target rational, efficient production and the economic development of rural areas, or pursue political 
goals by increasing the irrigated area, but its new projects face farmers with longstanding experience in 
irrigation. Thus, the irrigated landscapes envisioned by the planning state must compete with the 
localised, socialised territories, experienced by the communities over a relatively long period (Di Méo, 
1998; Ghiotti, 2006; Ruf, 2014). 
Our two case studies revealed that the encounter between the state and farmers differed according 
to the historical and existing modes of water management and the related farming systems. In 
Kemalpaşa the top-down implementation of a small dam project was met by dynamic, groundwater-
based irrigation cooperatives. These cooperatives negotiated the terms of their involvement: the DSI 
was looking for a 'taker' for a planned project, while the cooperatives saw the small dams as an 
opportunity to further secure its water supply and position itself for future negotiations. The DSI 
preferred to transfer the dam’s management to an irrigation cooperative rather than to urban 
municipalities, as it prefers working with the former. Conversely, in Emiralem, where the relationship 
between the state and farmers had been tense in the past, farmers were reluctant to relinquish their 
individual, groundwater-based irrigation system, and no irrigation cooperative was created to manage 
the newly built small dam, even though farmers were actively using its water on an informal basis. We 
believe this could be the first step towards a "renegotiation of their independence" (Kuper et al., 2009) 
with the DSI in an area where relationships between the state and farmers are highly symbolic, and 
farmers claim their autonomy through groundwater while still officially being members of an irrigation 
association. 
CONCLUSION 
This paper has explored the shifting role of the hydraulic administration in irrigation planning and 
development in Turkey. We have shown that the DSI is still pursuing its historical 'hydraulic mission', 
presently through the '1000 small dams in 1000 days' programme, which is being implemented at 
village level but has a widespread geographical spread over the national territory. This development in 
infrastructure, however, is taking place in a different context from that of the 20th century. The 
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hydraulic administration now faces experienced farmers who have largely taken agricultural 
development into their own hands by irrigating with groundwater to support intensive and competitive 
farming systems and who are well versed in negotiations with public authorities. Our research shows 
that farmers engage with the infrastructural development interventions of the hydraulic administration 
(pressurised drip irrigation, high-value agriculture, etc) but in a way that best suits their local context, 
needs and interests. Irrigators are not passive recipients but rather dynamic agents who try to adapt to 
change, notably by diversifying their livelihood strategies (Scoones, 2009; Keyder and Yenal, 2011) and, 
in our case, the modalities of access and use of irrigation water. 
The modernisation of irrigated waterscapes through irrigation development is no longer exclusively 
in the hands of the hydraulic administration. Although the planning and implementation of the '1000 
small dams in 1000 days' programme did not involve any consultations with farmers, multiple 
interactions took place on how the small dams should be managed, and irrigation cooperatives had a 
degree of bargaining power as intermediaries between irrigators and representatives of the state. By 
discussing the encounters between the administration and rural communities, our study contributes to 
an emerging literature that questions the idea that the Turkish state is monolithic and disconnected 
from the rest of society (see Aymes et al., 2013). Our findings support Gourisse’s (2013) call for studies 
on the coproduction of public action in Turkey. These should move away from a dichotomous vision 
framing a dominant state and civil society as independent blocs and instead open the blackbox of their 
interdependence. This could be undertaken through empirical studies of local initiatives in rural Turkey 
that inevitably enter a dialogue with the state. 
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